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Accurate modeling of opinion dynamics has the potential to help us understand polarization and
what makes effective political discourse possible or impossible. Here, we use differential equations
to model the evolution of political opinions within a continuously distributed population. We uti-
lize a network-free system of determining political influence and a local-attraction, distal-repulsion
dynamic for reaction to perceived content. Our approach allows for the incorporation of intergroup
bias such that messages from trusted in-group sources enjoy greater leeway than out-group ones.
The framework we put forward can reproduce real-world political distributions and experimentally
observed dynamics, and is amenable to further refinement as more data becomes available.
INTRODUCTION
The field of opinion dynamics seeks to understand
the evolution of ideas in populations, a complex in-
terdisciplinary endeavor which has attracted a wide
variety of approaches from different disciplines. Af-
ter early mathematical groundwork [1], the growth
of network science has led to a boom in models which
utilize neighbor-based update rules to examine long-
term outcomes for opinion distributions, such as po-
larization and consensus [2–15]. Other researchers
have advanced “sociophysics” approaches such as
Ising [16, 17], Sznajd [18, 19], and generalized-kinetic
models [20–23] which apply techniques from physics
to analyze analogous social systems [24]. Comple-
mentary to these modeling approaches, theoretical
and empirical work from economics and social sci-
ence has examined the political bias of media entities
[25, 26] and their influence on a population [27–31].
All these approaches contribute valuable insight to-
wards an understanding of this complex topic, but
the disparities between their perspectives make di-
rect cohesion a challenge.
Our model takes a different approach, which we
believe achieves the key benefits of previous models
while expanding flexibility and retaining the ability
to incorporate real-world data as it becomes avail-
able. One key structural choice we make is to mod-
ularize the process of opinion change by breaking it
into two parts: perceptions and reactions.
In our model, individuals perceive a probabilis-
tic mix of politicized experiences which depends on
their ideology and party. This might be thought
a
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FIG. 1: (a) Empirical ideological distributions by
U.S. political party. Average ideological position score
from 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) on
social, economic, and military issues for 1256 U.S. Twitter
users. Data from [32]. (b) Model predictions. Steady
state for our simulated population of 70,900 Democrats and
54,700 Republicans, with party perception curves shown in
the inset. See Results section for details.
of as the continuum limit of a network approach,
where influences are so numerous and varied that
interactions are best characterized by a probability
distribution rather than explicit neighboring agents.
This approach also allows us to encapsulate broader
societal influences such as politicized media environ-
ments, since individuals’ perceptual mix may be con-
stantly changing to reflect their changing worldview.
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2We model individuals’ reactions to these percep-
tions by having their ideology evolve in continuous
time. This is governed by ordinary and stochastic
differential equations which depend on their current
position and their perceptual distribution.
Together, these perception and reaction modules
capture a feedback loop between individuals’ cur-
rent beliefs, the biased “slice” of the political world
they perceive, and how they update those beliefs as
a result.
Political Spectrum
Like many prior approaches (e.g. [2, 3, 10, 13, 25,
28, 29, 32–34]), we consider a single, finite ideol-
ogy axis. Extensions to this are possible, as dis-
cussed in section S4 of the Supplementary Infor-
mation (SI), but the unidimensional approximation
is supported by empirical results showing that the
liberal-conservative dimension captures the great
majority of modern legislative behavior [35]. Fig-
ure 1(a) shows a one-dimensional projection of po-
litical ideology for the U.S. population based on one
study [32]; though the precise methods of projecting
the political landscape onto one axis differ between
sources, other recent reports like that of Pew Re-
search [34] show good qualitative agreement.
We will use the term belief score, b, to refer to
an individual’s ideological position between −1 (ex-
treme liberal) and +1 (extreme conservative). We
abstract all politically-opinionated information an
individual is exposed to (hereafter termed percepts,
p) onto this same axis, so that a percept of p = +0.5
is in support of belief score +0.5 (conservative), a
percept with value p = 0 argues for a neutral stance,
and so on. Due to the imprecise nature of any mea-
surement on this scale (it’s a projection of a highly
abstract space that can be quantified in different
ways), qualitative results should be robust to small
changes in these values.
Opinion Change
Classic “bounded-confidence” models (e.g., [2, 3]),
which allow for individuals to interact only with oth-
ers who are relatively like-minded, have been used
to capture the effect of homophily on interaction.
But political issues are contentious and are often
brought up between those who disagree, and are
easily suffused with negative emotional affect rather
than agreement or indifference. Repulsion from dis-
liked positions seems to be an important determi-
nant in swing voters: a recent Pew survey [36] found
that U.S. independents supporting one of the politi-
cal parties did so mostly due to negative perceptions
of the other party. So like some other extensions to
bounded-confidence models (e.g., [10, 13]), we sup-
plement local-attraction behavior with distal repul-
sion: individuals who are exposed to ideas which are
too different from their own will not be attracted,
but rather be repelled from the espoused position
of the source. There is experimental evidence that
this can be a very potent and real source of ideolog-
ical movement: in recent work from Bail et al. [32],
it was found that exposure to 24 tweets per day
from a prominent member of the opposing party can
have a significant repulsive effect over the course of
a month, even among all other political inputs re-
ceived by the participants (self-identified politically
active Twitter users).
METHODS
The first key component of our model is the reac-
tion function. This is a continuous function which
relates an individual’s shift in ideological belief to
the difference between a perceived political opinion
(the percept, p) and the individual’s own belief, b;
we will refer to this difference p−b as the dissonance.
A repulsion effect will be modeled through the ex-
istence of a repulsion distance d such that percepts
less dissonant than d will be attractive and percepts
more dissonant than d will be repulsive. This pa-
rameter d can be allowed to vary depending on the
context of the message, which will allow us to model
the important effect of intergroup bias: for exam-
ple, a somewhat challenging position can be repul-
sive when it comes from a disliked source but attrac-
tive when introduced by a member of one’s in-group
(see “Adding Intergroup Bias” below).
One simple form for a reaction function that sat-
isfies the above conditions employs a cubic depen-
dence on dissonance:
R(p− b; d) = (p− b)
[
1− (p− b)
2
d2
]
, (1)
shown visually in Fig. 2.
To organically constrain belief dynamics to a
bounded domain (in our case, [−1, 1]), we temper the
above reaction function with a multiplicative factor
(1 − b2). This has the effect of gradually damping
motion near the extremes—thus we interpret the ±1
boundaries of our finite ideology scale to be asymp-
totic extremes that are only approachable, not at-
tainable. We also scale the dynamics by a time con-
3-0.5 0.5
FIG. 2: Example reaction function. Here we show a
cubic reaction function, where an individual’s reaction
depends on dissonance p− b. Vertical scale has arbitrary
units: the magnitude of this movement depends on time
constant τ and current belief score b. For this image a
repulsion distance of d = 0.8 was chosen.
stant τ , which controls the speed of belief change.
Then, for an individual j with belief score bj and re-
pulsion distance d, exposed to percept p (which may
depend on many factors), we arrive at the following
differential equation for ideological dynamics:
τ
dbj
dt
= (1− b2j )
{
(p− bj)
[
1− (p− bj)
2
d2
]}
. (2)
Perceptual Diets
An important question remains: which individu-
als are exposed to which messages? The vast ma-
jority of work on opinion dynamics has been in a
network context, wherein agents update their opin-
ions according to a rule incorporating the positions
of some other agent(s) (e.g. [1–7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17–
19, 24]). Our approach sidesteps the need for con-
structing explicit influence networks, which are diffi-
cult to capture due to the many modalities of human
interaction. Instead we suppose that an individual’s
party affiliation and current political position deter-
mine their perceived “slice” of the political world—
a probability distribution of political experiences1.
This continuum approach allows us to personalize
political environments to account for “media bub-
bles” and other biased environments even without a
network, and is easily scaled to large populations.
1 Note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with a network
approach; we believe a dynamical interaction network de-
pendent on affiliation and political position could lead to a
similar model.
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FIG. 3: Flow diagram. Example of differential movement
for a population uniformly exposed to a percept with score
+0.25 assuming repulsion distance 1 (see Eq. (3)). Vertical
axis scaling is arbitrary.
Toy Models
Simplest Model
For the simplest concrete implementation of our
framework, we might suppose a single-party popula-
tion is initially distributed across the belief spectrum
but is otherwise homogeneous, and that every indi-
vidual perceives the same constant percept p = C.
Then upon choosing a repulsion distance d we can
exactly determine long-term behavior of the entire
group—there will be a single flow function that af-
fects the whole belief spectrum:
τ
dbj
dt
= (1− b2j )
{
(C − bj)
[
1− (C − bj)
2
d2
]}
. (3)
This ordinary differential equation (ODE) has fixed
points at b = C, b = C ± d, and b = ±1 (due to
the imposed domain bounds). The fixed point at
b = C is stable, and stability of the other points
alternates. For example, if we use the cubic reaction
function from Fig. 2 above and set d = 1, C = 0.25,
then that party’s population experiences differential
movement as shown in Fig. 3.
Fixed points exist at {−1,−0.75, 0.25, 1, 1.25}
(though beliefs are constrained to the [−1, 1] do-
main, so the theoretical fixed point at 1.25 is not
meaningful). Given time, all observers between
−0.75 and 1 would congregate at 0.25, and all ob-
servers starting left of −0.75 would converge to −1.
This small segment of the population—the mem-
bers that are liberal enough to be repelled by the
“party line”—might be likely to switch parties in fa-
vor of one with more comfortable percepts, though
we don’t include such party-switching dynamics in
this initial model.
4Adding Intergroup Bias
We would also like our modeling framework to ac-
commodate the tendency for individuals to be more
receptive to information from those whom they per-
ceive as allies, i.e., part of their “in-group” [37]. For
the simplest case, we modify our previous model by
adding an “out-group” with its own distinct con-
stant “party line” percept po. Now percepts have
a party identity attached to them, and we allow in-
dividuals to consume a mixed diet of in-group and
out-group information, at belief scores of pi and po,
respectively. We set repulsion distances di and do
for in-group (e.g., U.S. Republican) and out-group
(e.g., U.S Democrat) messengers, with do ≤ di. We
can set a fixed fraction f for in-party content, or al-
low for a belief-dependent skew f(b) such that, e.g.,
liberal Republicans view a higher fraction of Demo-
cratic content than their conservative party-mates.
The average flow function db/dt is then a simple
weighted average of the flow functions in Eq. (2) due
to each source:
τ
db
dt
= (1− b2) [fRi + (1− f)Ro] , (4)
where in general f = f(b), Ri = R(p − b; di), and
Ro = R(p− b; do).
To understand the flow in this case, it is informa-
tive to consider the purely in-group and purely out-
group situations (f = 1 or 0, respectively), because
all fractional perceptual “diets” are interpolated be-
tween them (see Fig. 4). We note that exposure to
some out-group content can in some cases increase
polarization for a small extreme group—for exam-
ple, in Fig. 4, individuals starting with b > 0.75
will on average move rightward when exposed to
percepts from a 70%/30% combination of in-group
and out-group sources, respectively (solid curve),
whereas those same individuals would move leftward
if presented with in-group information alone (dotted
curve). This simple example shows how exposure
to—and rejection of—opposing content can have a
polarizing influence on a population.
Note that we assume that this “tribal” bias only
affects the reaction to content, not its subjectively
perceived ideological score p. However, the inclu-
sion of such an additional bias effect is reasonable,
and may be handled with a slight increase to model
complexity (see section S4 of the SI).
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FIG. 4: Flow with different messengers. The flow
functions for in-group (dotted) and out-group (dashed)
messages of pi = +0.25 and po = −0.25 with repulsion
distances of 1 and 0.75, respectively. The solid curve is the
net flow if individuals are exposed to 70% in-group and 30%
out-group percepts. Vertical axis scaling is arbitrary.
Adding Personalized Perceptions
Instead of constant political messaging across the
whole belief spectrum, we now consider a “percep-
tion curve” p(b) linking individuals’ perceived world
to their current beliefs. This reflects the differing
“slice” of the world that individuals see as a result
of their differing environments and personal biases.
In our simplest model, where p = C, the percep-
tion curve is a horizontal line in b vs p space; indi-
viduals at all b values perceive the same thing. In
a hypothetical “perfectly targeted” world, the per-
ception curve would be the 45◦ line p = b, and no-
body would change belief because each person would
perceive content perfectly in line with their current
worldview.
Luckily, we don’t need to privilege one such curve
in particular—a graphical analysis method lets us
combine any perception curve with the reaction
function and read off a (qualitative) flow for each
segment of the population. To do this, we plot the
perception curve p(b), and overlay the 45◦ line for
reference—any time the perception curve intersects
it, the individuals at that belief score are station-
ary, since their average perceptions are in agreement
with their current beliefs. If the perception curve is
slightly above the 45◦ line, individuals with those be-
liefs are perceiving something slightly more conser-
vative than their own views, and move right. Simi-
larly, people move left wherever the perception curve
is slightly below the 45◦ line.
We also overlay the repulsion boundaries at dis-
tance d above and below that p = b line. If the per-
ception curve exits the resulting “trust band” over
some b interval, that segment of the population is re-
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FIG. 5: Two-take world. Graphical analysis of
step-function perception curves. Left panels: perception
curves color coded for the movement induced, along with
dashed p = b line and repulsion boundaries. Right panels:
Projection of that flow-velocity color onto the belief axis,
compared with the exact population flow calculated from
Eq. (2) (black curve). Top row: When perception curves lie
within the trust region, we see two attractors at the “party
line” belief values. Bottom row: with more extreme “party
lines,” centrists are repelled by either party position,
creating a stable central attractor.
pelled and moves the opposite direction from what
would be expected based on small deviations from
the 45◦ line.
It is then straightforward to determine the qual-
itative behavior of the whole population given any
perception curve p(b) by visually examining intersec-
tions of the perception curve with the 45◦ lines, as in
Fig. 5 (left panels). With a closed form expression
for p(b), we can use Eq. (2) to obtain an exact flow
function (black curves on right panels of Fig. 5), and
confirm our qualitative analysis. If multiple parties
are present, this analysis is performed separately for
each.
The real benefit of this graphical approach is its
generality; one can draw any perception curve one
would like and simply read off the fixed points and
stability. Whenever the perception curve crosses the
diagonal with slope less than one, that crossing be-
comes a stable fixed point. Whenever it crosses with
a slope greater than one, the crossing becomes an
unstable fixed point instead. If the perception curve
crosses a repulsion boundary, shallow crossings cre-
ate unstable points and steep crossings create stable
ones.
While the choice of perception curve entails a large
degree of modeling freedom, based on our graphi-
FIG. 6: Simulated population distribution. The stable
population state induced by flow function Eq. (3) with
added Gaussian noise (τ = 1, dt = 0.001, σ = 0.25,
N = 50, 000). Population was initialized to match
Republicans from Bail [32]. Inset: Perception curve, the
constant C = 0.25. All variation is in reaction.
cal analysis reasoning we know our model’s qualita-
tive predictions aren’t particularly sensitive to the
choice. Ideally, real-world data could (and should)
be used to construct such a curve (e.g., by evaluat-
ing the partisan positions of news sources and other
political influences experienced by individuals across
the political spectrum), though we leave this for fu-
ture work (see section S5 of the SI).
Adding Heterogeneity
To move toward a more realistic scenario, we must
allow for heterogeneity of both environments and in-
dividuals. We can introduce random variation in
two distinct components of the model: perceptions
(so individuals are exposed to a range of different in-
puts rather than a single determined value), and the
reaction function (so otherwise identical individuals
can react differently to the same percept). For the
latter, we add Gaussian noise to the reaction func-
tion R, which causes the stable fixed points from
our prior analysis to expand into finite-width stable
distributions; these may be estimated easily and ac-
curately by Euler-Maruyama numerical integration
of our now-stochastic differential equation (SDE).
For example, with the conditions in Fig. 6, the main
body of the party congregates around the primary
attractor at 0.25, and a small group is repelled to
−1 2.
If we wish to add variability to the percept in-
stead of the reaction, nonlinear effects become more
2 In cases like this with multiple attracting “camps” without
significant overlap, the long-term populations of each camp
may depend on initial conditions.
6important, since p (now properly a probability dis-
tribution ρ(p)) must be fed through reaction func-
tion R(p− b) before its effects are determined. This
means the net effect of the perceptual diet is a
weighted average over all possible percepts, which
for smooth percept distributions becomes an inte-
gral of R(p − b) against ρ(p). Due to the asym-
metry of the reaction function across the repulsion
boundary—repulsion as modeled above is stronger
than attraction—a symmetric distribution of per-
cepts centered at the boundary will have a net re-
pulsive effect. Thus, broadening a perceptual diet
effectively narrows the trust region, and there is a
critical noise threshold at which we observe noise-
induced pitchfork bifurcations of our fixed points—
this is discussed in greater detail in section S1 the
SI.
RESULTS
When we put together all the modeled effects
described above, we find robust realistic distribu-
tions at equilibrium (see Fig. 1(b)). We used sim-
ple sigmoid perception curves (shown in the inset to
Fig. 1(b), details in section S3 of the SI) for the peaks
of perceptual diets (standard deviation σp = 0.2),
and noisy reactions (standard deviation σr = 0.15),
along with simple linear fractional content ratios
fd = 0.7 + 0.2b (5)
fr = 0.7− 0.2b (6)
to emulate a “media bubble” effect. This model’s
steady state shows good agreement with real-world
distributions of U.S. political ideology from Bail et
al. [32] and Pew Research [34]—see Fig. 1. For easy
comparison with real data, Fig. 1(b) shows a simula-
tion of one hundred times Bail et al.’s experimental
population: 70,900 Democrats and 54,700 Repub-
licans. In this comparison, we must note that our
belief scale is not identical to theirs; ±1 on our scale
are asymptotically extreme, whereas 1 and 7 on Bail
et al.’s scale are attainable and signify strong agree-
ment on all surveyed issues.
We can also replicate the experiment of Bail et
al. in silico: starting with a population at equilib-
rium (shown in Fig. 1(b)), and artificially inducing
counter-attitudinal Democratic content to Republi-
can experimental subjects (a distribution peaked at
p = −0.75, weighted as if it consisted of 24 per-
cepts on top of a presumed diet of 100 percepts per
day) over the course of 30 “days,” causes the mean
position of those subjects to shift rightwards by a
little less than half its natural standard deviation
(from 0.30 to 0.42, stdev σ ≈ 0.3). This matches
the findings of Bail et al., who found average right-
ward movement of 0.6 points on a 1-to-7 scale, which
represented between 0.11 and 0.59 standard devia-
tions (p < 0.01) [32]. Implementation details can be
found in section S3 of the SI.
DISCUSSION
We have put forward a modeling framework for in-
dividual political opinion drift which separates per-
ceived content and the reaction of the viewer to that
content, in order to separately model perceptual fil-
tering, the shift from attraction to repulsion for dis-
sonant content, and the effect of intergroup bias. We
have presented toy models to elucidate each effect
on its own in the absence of noise, and introduced a
graphical analysis technique for qualitative analysis
of behavior under general belief-dependent percep-
tion curves. With the inclusion of additive noise,
analytically determined fixed points widen into sta-
ble distributions.
With all these effects included and some simple
parameter assumptions, we showed that population
distributions matching recent survey data emerge
naturally. Furthermore, we were able to simulate
the experiment of Bail et al. [32] and found similar
outcomes.
Our approach allows for modeling of important
psychological effects such as self-serving bias (per-
ception curves are increasing functions of b) and in-
tergroup bias (repulsion distance depends on source)
without requiring a network. This frees future data-
gathering efforts from the often challenging task of
network tie construction, and allows for easy simu-
lation of very large populations.
In order to approach this topic, we have made con-
siderable simplifications, and it is easy to imagine
extensions which might increase the realism of this
model (as we discuss in section S4 of the SI). We
have intentionally chosen a relatively simple struc-
ture which is nonetheless able to capture psycholog-
ical tendencies for repulsion and tribalism, and cou-
ple them to a politicized environment, while preserv-
ing mathematical tractability. A paucity of available
data has forced us to make assumptions on func-
tional forms and parameter values. While these are
reasonable placeholders, they can be modified or re-
placed as empirical data become available; it isn’t
hard to imagine experiments which might elucidate
qualitative and quantitative effects of interest (see
section S5 of the SI). We hope this endeavor leads to
7a new sort of data-driven political modeling to bet-
ter understand human behavior, polarization, and
strategies for effective political dialogue.
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9Supplementary Information for “When Pull Turns To Shove: A Mathematical
Model For Opinion Dynamics”
S1. PERCEPTION DISTRIBUTIONS
As we mention in the “adding heterogeneity” section of the main paper, if our model is to have any claim
at accurately modeling the political lives of real people, it must allow individuals to consume not just a
single, constant percept p(b) but rather a whole distribution of content, ρ(p; b, σp). In this case, instead of
using the single p value to determine an individual’s reaction, we calculate their weighted-average reaction
by integrating the probability distribution of percepts they might receive multiplied by the reaction those
percepts would cause. We note that our cubic reaction function is asymmetric across the repulsion boundary
(it’s steeper outside the boundary than inside, so repulsion is “stronger” than attraction). Thus, if individuals
receive a Gaussian distribution of percepts centered at their “perception curve” value p(b), this symmetric
widening of their experiences has the asymmetric effect of shifting the system’s fixed points: since it takes
fewer repulsive events than attractive ones to maintain net-zero movement, the fixed point occurs when the
center of the perceptual distribution is still in the trust region. In other words, the repulsion boundary is
effectively narrowed with regard to the peak percept value p(b).
The precise effects of this perceptual variety depend on the shape of the perceptual distribution and
the choice of reaction function. First we consider Gaussian-distributed percepts centered on the “perception
curve” value p(b), and the cubic reaction function from Eq. (1) of the main text, (p−b)[1−(p−b)2/d2]. These
choices are convenient in that the integral for average belief change is analytically tractable. For clarity, we
change variables to “average dissonance” µ = p(b) − b, and let x be the dummy variable of integration for
possible dissonance. An approximate version of this integral, with infinite limits of integration (so that many
terms drop out), is:
τ
〈
db
dt
〉
=
(
1− b2) +∞∫
−∞
[
1√
2piσp
e
− (x−µ)2
2σ2p
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ(x;b,σp)
x
(
1− x
2
d2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(x)
dx
=
(
1− b2) µ[ (d2 − 3σ2p)
d2
− µ
2
d2
]
. (S7)
We see that d2 − 3σ2p plays the role that d2 played before, setting the non-origin zeros of the cubic; when
µ2 is greater than this value, the average movement of the individual is away from the peak percept. There
is also a critical variance σ2c = d
2/3 at which the system undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation. For σp > σc the
bracketed term in Eq. (S7) is always negative, i.e., the net change in belief is always contrary to the average
media perceived. See Figure S7.
These distribution widths are not unrealistically large; as seen in Fig. S7, for a repulsion distance of 0.8
the standard deviation needs only be 0.46 for the overall effect of a content distribution to be repulsive
(i.e. causing movement away from that distribution’s mean). Thus, especially for out-group content with
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-0.5 0.5
p = 0
p = 0.3
p = 0.5
FIG. S7: Effect of perception distribution width on reaction. Net change in belief db/dt versus
expected value of dissonance µ for varying levels of perception distribution width, from Eq. (S7) with
d = 0.8. The critical standard deviation for d = 0.8 is σc = 0.8/
√
3 ≈ 0.46.
a naturally narrower repulsion distance, viewing a wider distribution of that content can actually cause
repulsion, since the extreme percepts will repel the viewer more than the moderate percepts will attract
them.
To visualize the effects of normally distributed perceptual distributions ρ(p; b, σp) replacing deterministic
percepts p(b), we can examine density plots for the net movement for all combinations of b and p (repulsion
distance d = 0.8): see Fig. S8. This is the space that our graphical analysis technique utilizes: if we establish
a perception curve p(b), the values of this map that the curve crosses are the realized average movement for
each part of the population.
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FIG. S8: Reaction map for normally distributed diets. Average movement caused by normally
distributed perceptual diets with peak p, for individuals at belief score b, and repulsion distance d = 0.8.
Results shown for σp = 0.2 (top left), 0.3 (top right), 0.4 (bottom left), and 0.5 (bottom right).
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A. Bounded Percepts: Truncated Gaussian
In deriving Eq. S7 we approximated by integrating over the entire real line for dissonance when it should
be constrained to the range allowed by percepts in [−1, 1]—that is, from dissonance x = −1 − b to 1 − b.
That makes the result somewhat more complicated (note: lacking symmetry around b, we don’t utilize the
µ substitution, and x represents percept value instead of dissonance):
τ
〈
db
dt
〉
= (1− b2)
∫ 1
−1
[
1√
2piσp
e
− (x−p)2
2σ2p
]{
(x− b)
[
1− (x− b)
2
d2
]}
dx
= A
(
1− b2)σp
d2
√
2pi
{[
1− d2 + 2σ2p + p2 − 3pb+ 2b2
] [
e
−(−1+p)2
2σ2p − e
−(1+p)2
2σ2p
]
+ [p− 3b]
[
e
−(−1+p)2
2σ2p + e
−(1+p)2
2σ2p
]}
+
(
1− b2) [p− b]
2d2
{
d2 − 3σ2p − [p− b]2
}[
erf
(
1 + p√
2σp
)
+ erf
(
−1 + p√
2σp
)]
. (S8)
where A is a normalization factor depending on b and σp needed to make the truncated Gaussian integrate
to 1:
A =
1
1√
2piσp
∫ 1
−1 e
−(x−p)2
2σ2p dx
=
2[
erf
(
1+p√
2σp
)
− erf
(
−1+p√
2σp
)]
Fig. S9 shows the reaction map for these truncated-normal diets, computed analytically at each b and p
combination.
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FIG. S9: Reaction map for truncated-normal diets. Expected movement caused by truncated-normal
perceptual diets with peak p (vertical axis), for individuals at belief score b (horizontal axis), with repulsion
distance d = 0.8. Results shown for σp = 0.2 (top left), 0.3 (top right), 0.4 (bottom left), and 0.5 (bottom
right).
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B. Bounded Percepts: Beta Distributions
For our simulations, we bounded perceptual diets in a more natural way, by utilizing beta distributions
stretched to fit [−1, 1]. These distributions approach zero at the boundaries of our domain, fitting our
asymptotic-extremes interpretation of this axis. The beta distribution with our endpoints has the equation
Beta[−1,1](x;α, β) = 4
(1 + x)α−1(1− x)β−1
2α+β
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
, (S9)
where α and β are parameters of the distribution and Γ is the gamma function.
We can construct a distribution to have any desired mode (peak) p(b) and standard deviation σp by solving
the implicit equations
mode = p =
α− β
α+ β − 2 (S10)
variance = σ2p =
4αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
(S11)
for α, β > 1 in terms of p and σ. Examples are shown in Fig. S10.
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3
FIG. S10: Beta-distributed diets. Examples of beta distributions with peaks at −0.9,−0.5, 0, 0.5, and
0.9. All have the same standard deviation, σp = 0.2.
Unfortunately, when using these beta distributions, the weighting integrals with our cubic reaction function
aren’t possible to evaluate in closed form. However, we may numerically compute these integrals for a finite
grid of p and b values at any chosen standard deviation to visualize the reaction space. In Fig. S11, we can
see the repulsion boundaries bending and bifurcating as σp increases.
Computing a reaction map like S8, S9 or S11 allows us to use our graphical analysis technique with any
perception curve, to get a sense of average population drift for the whole political spectrum.
S2. STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION DETAILS
For the “realistic” simulation shown in Fig. 1 of the main text, we used beta-distributed perceptual diets
with constant standard deviation σp. Party perception curves pD(b) and pR(b) determine the peaks of
these distributions, so that individuals see in-group and out-group content distributions ρin(p; b, σp) and
ρout(p; b, σp). The average effect of each distribution is the integral against the reaction such content would
cause (i.e., Eqs. (S13) and (S14)). Each group’s effect on the observer is weighted by its content fraction, then
the stochastic reaction-noise term is added before all movement is edge-damped, leaving us with Eq. (S15).
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FIG. S11: Reaction map for beta-distributed diets. Average movement caused by beta-distributed
perceptual diets with peak p, for individuals at belief score b, and repulsion distance d = 0.8. Results
shown for σp = 0.2 (top left), 0.3 (top right), 0.4 (bottom left), and 0.5 (bottom right).
R(p− b; d) = (p− b)
[
1− (p− b)
2
d2
]
(S12)
vin =
∫ 1
−1
R(p− b; din) ρin(p; b, σp)dp (S13)
vout =
∫ 1
−1
R(p− b; dout) ρout(p; b, σp)dp (S14)
τ db = (1− b2) {[fvin + (1− f)vout] dt+ σrdW} (S15)
This can be made computationally feasible by discretizing the b and p domains (e.g., to the nearest
hundredth) and computing the integrals vin and vout at each possible combination—as was done for Figs. S9
and S11, which show vout for different σp values. Then in iteration, we simply reference the nearest-case pre-
computed value (nearest-neighbor interpolation) rather than computing each individual’s weighting integral
at each time-step.
S3. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Our “realistic” simulation shown in Fig. 1b of the main text initialized the population’s starting beliefs to
uniform random values in [−1, 1] for both parties. The sigmoid perception curves (shown in Fig. 1b inset)
used were:
Republicans: pR(b) = 0.6 tanh[1.05/0.6(b− 0.35)] + 0.42,
Democrats: pD(b) = 0.7 tanh[1.00/0.7(b+ 0.46)]− 0.55 .
Parameter values were:
di = 1.3, do = 0.8, σp = 0.2, σr = 0.15 .
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In-group fraction scaled linearly and symmetrically from 0.5 (for b = +1 Democrats and b = −1 Republicans)
to 0.9 (for b = −1 Democrats and b = +1 Republicans):
fD(b) = 0.7 + 0.2b,
fR(b) = 0.7− 0.2b .
Equations (S12), (S13), (S14), (S15) determined population movement over time, utilizing Euler-Maruyama
numerical integration. For finding equilibria, the time constant τ = 1 was used.
For simulation of Bail’s experiment, the population was initialized at its equilibrium, but in addition to
vin and vout there was a third influence vbot based on an out-group distribution peaked at value p = −0.75
shown to Republicans and p = 0.3 shown to Democrats, to roughly match the other party’s distribution.
This extra out-group effect was weighted as if it were 24 additional percepts on top of a 100-percept daily
diet, i.e., with weight fbot = 24/124. So Eq. (S15) becomes
τ db = (1− b2) {[(1− fbot)(fvin + (1− f)vout) + fbotvbot] dt+ σrdW} . (S16)
Under this assumption, the time constant τ = 30 caused movement in agreement with Bail et al. [32]: slight
leftward movement of Democrat mean from −0.51 to −0.53 (about 6% of its natural standard deviation),
but significant rightward movement of the Republican mean from 0.30 to 0.42 (about 40% of its natural
standard deviation).
S4. SOME ADDITIONAL EXTENSIONS
One simple extension is the addition of more groups/parties, such as independent/unaligned individuals
and messages. This would require another perception curve, and a three- or more-way fractional content
breakdown instead of the single in-group fraction f(b) as our analysis used.
Additional affiliations such as religion, race, regional identity, etc., may be added to the model without
change to the framework. These affiliations would appear as labels that affect the perception curve(s)—since
affiliations can change what individuals are exposed to—and inter-group bias, since identity can affect how
one reacts to others’ opinions and identity. In particular, the repulsion distance d, representing “trust,”
“credulity,” or “benefit of the doubt,” can depend on each affiliation of the individual and of the messenger
to allow for more intricate inter-group prejudices than just in-party and out-of-party trust levels. One could
of course also add noise to d values to model individual variation in level of credulity towards other groups.
However, given the difficulty of measuring inter-group trust levels, we chose to avoid over-fitting by only
utilizing party affiliation in our simulations.
One might also generalize this model to multiple dimensions: instead of a scalar belief value b, an n-
dimensional vector b would represent an individual’s beliefs with respect to each of n issue axes. Percepts
would engage with one or more of these issues. Lacking relevant data, we do not put forward assumptions
on how reaction dynamics might be coupled; one might assume that dynamics along each axis would be
largely independent of one another, since position on one issue rarely affects position on another directly.
However, it is possible that the dynamics along multiple axes would be coupled by tribalism; being repelled
from a message might drive an individual closer to the opposing camp on more axes than just the one being
engaged with, as the individual identifies more strongly with the whole opposing party. Individuals might
also be attracted or repelled from an entire message rather than each position espoused; if a percept engages
with three issues and its position on one would be repulsive but on the other two it would be attractive, does
the individual shift each position independently, or form a combined judgment of the percept as a whole,
and attract or repel from it accordingly?
One might also suggest that individuals perceive a more extreme version of the other party as they
become more extreme themselves. This would require additional perception curves for out-group content
rather than re-using the same curve for both parties—in particular, the curves that determine out-group
content might be decreasing with belief instead of increasing. The large dissonance numbers in this case
would likely require a different reaction function—one in which repulsion saturates—since repulsion quickly
dwarfs attraction under our cubic function. As an additional bonus, these new cross-party perception curves
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could incorporate partisan interpretation bias, such that even the same statement could be given a different
subjective ideological rating (p value) when individuals believe it comes from an out-party source.
Another potential extension would be the addition of mechanisms by which the perception curves can
change. Time-dependence could be introduced to investigate hypotheses about changing media environments,
or perception curves might evolve in response to the population state. The latter option would provide a
form of indirect coupling between modeled individuals.
S5. FURTHER WORK
The modular structure of our model is amenable to the incorporation of further data, replacing idealized
functions and parameters with empirical distributions from surveys and experiments. For example, to refine
the reaction function, further experiments like that of Bail et al. [32] might investigate the impact of political
opinions on individuals, and how the messenger’s apparent identity affects the reception of dissonant ideas.
As for perceptual environments, the non-network approach means that data collection can focus on averages
and distributions rather than influence-network properties and tie reconstruction. Perceptual diets might
be estimated from the top down: each media outlet (or other notable source of political influence) might be
assigned an ideology score (as others have done, see, e.g., [25, 26, 29, 38]), and surveys or viewership data
could determine which content is consumed in what proportion by each part of the ideological spectrum.
Alternately, self-report of political influences and their positions could produce estimates of perceptual diets
which also account for interpretation bias—the same content might be interpreted differently by different
observers.
Regardless of the approach, any such data-driven realization of this framework will possess greater va-
lidity and predictive power as more data is collected. We hope that this modeling framework will afford a
better understanding of individual and population-level opinion dynamics, and the feedback effects due to
personalized political environments.
